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 Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce
 in Nineteenth-Century America
 ELIZABETH B. CLARK
 [I]n the covenant of marriage, [woman] is compelled to promise obe-
 dience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her
 master-the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to
 administer chastisement. He has so framed the law of divorce ... as to
 be wholly regardless of the happiness of women-the law, in all cases,
 going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all
 power into his hands.'
 As early as 1848, in the first public meeting on woman's rights, feminists
 raised the touchy issues of women's marital subjugation and divorce.
 They complained that the laws of marriage and divorce were framed
 for the benefit of men and to entrap women within the oppressive
 institution of marriage. Another controversial claim made at Seneca
 Falls-that to the ballot-went on to become the great organizing
 principle for women's campaigns for legal and political reform. But
 despite the bold beginning, divorce remained a complex and divisive
 issue for feminists throughout the century. Although legislatures in
 most states in the mid-nineteenth century were systematically liberal-
 izing divorce laws, they could not lift the social stigma attached to it.2
 Fearful of being branded as anti-marriage or anti-family, or believing
 in the permanency of marriage, many feminists spoke of divorce
 reluctantly, and never used their formidable organizing skills to launch
 a full-scale assault on laws restricting the dissolution of marriage.
 Elizabeth Cady Stanton stood as the great exception to this rule. An
 early and ardent champion of liberal divorce, her arguments were
 highly influential in the development of nineteenth-century feminist
 theory.3 A few feminists followed Stanton whole-heartedly, some agreed
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 with her in part, still others were shocked at her advocacy of measures
 they felt would tend toward the disruption of marriage and the family.
 Yet even for those feminists who resisted her conclusions, the analysis
 of marriage she offered-"from covenant to contract" could have been
 her rallying cry-was transformative. Despite its mixed reception,
 Stanton's theory of divorce and family relations helped to shape
 nineteenth-century American attitudes toward marriage.
 Stanton's theory of divorce became as well a critical platform for
 her maturing theory of rights, which was far more in tune with both
 mainstream feminist and liberal thought of her day than were her ideas
 about divorce. Stanton's work, emphasizing the ultimate "right" to
 free oneself from obligations that had become unwanted bonds, paved
 the way for a liberal feminist theory that rested on the autonomy of
 the individual. She helped to promote both the growth of a family law
 based on a contractual theory of relations and a view of politics that
 deemed the rights of individuals paramount. In Stanton's work, personal
 autonomy began to constitute the individual's citizenship in a way that
 has become a dominant motif in American life.
 Stanton's vision of individual rights drew heavily on ideas of slavery
 and freedom, and the debate over their definitions that raged in post-
 Civil War America. Stanton's adoption of the radical extremes of
 freedom and slavery to describe the condition of women has left a
 mixed legacy. The most brilliant and dynamic feminist theorist of her
 day, she helped forge a language of individual liberty that acted as a
 catalyst for social change.4 Nevertheless, the adoption of the slavery
 paradigm to describe marriage narrowed Stanton's perceptions of
 women's condition and dictated an appeal to a specific sort of legal
 remedy that both shaped and limited feminist goals during the nine-
 teenth century.
 Divorce in the Antebellum Era
 In January of 1853, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, acting on behalf of the
 New York State Woman's Temperance Society, offered a ten-dollar
 prize for the best essay entitled "The Duty of the Drunkard's Wife,"
 in the women's temperance newspaper Lily. The readers of the Lily,
 themselves a progressive group, rose to the challenge.5 Well coached,
 all took the position that Stanton and Susan B. Anthony had been
 urging in the Lily's columns in the preceding months: that wives of
 chronic inebriates had a duty to seek a separation, to sever the conjugal
 relationship, so as not to be the agent of breeding a drunkard's children.
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 The contestants, however, chose in the end to resolve their characters'
 problems through separation, death, or desertion; none broached the
 subject of legal divorce. Half-measures never satisfied Stanton, and for
 her these analyses fell short: The Lily contains no record of the prize
 being awarded.
 The liberalization of divorce laws was by no means foreordained.
 Even progressive minds feared the path to easy divorce, disagreeing
 about its significance, its desirability, and its consequences. Antebellum
 reformers recognized the need for legal separation or divorce most
 consistently in the case of the chronically drunken husband. Under
 these circumstances, a virtually unanimous consensus prevailed that
 the law must somehow intervene. The Lily, whose subject matter ranged
 between the poles of temperance and women's rights, rendered in
 particularly lurid tones the plight of the battered mother bound for life
 to a "moral monster-[a] vulgar, gross, imbruted nature."6 Indeed,
 feminists who remained deeply committed to the Christian ideal of
 lifelong marriage agreed on the need for the equivalent of a legal
 separation, contingent upon reforms in the law of marital property to
 safeguard women's rights.
 Fueled by the broader reform agitation over family law in the 1850s,
 the debate on divorce extended beyond feminist circles. In the early
 1850s, the editor of the New York Tribune, Horace Greeley, engaged
 the anarchist and free lover Stephen Pearl Andrews and the Boston
 Swedenborgian Henry James, Sr., in an extended and highly publicized
 debate over the ongoing liberalization of divorce laws. In 1860, Greeley
 took up his cudgel again, this time against Robert Dale Owen, son of
 communitarian Robert Owen.7 Not just divorce but the function of
 family law was at stake in these debates. Greeley served as the linchpin,
 or perhaps the lightning rod, articulating a strain of thought that held
 that family law existed to coerce "moral" or socially desirable behavior.
 He valued the maintenance of the family as a social unit well above
 any measure of personal or erotic satisfaction and delighted in pointing
 out that the law warned people to exercise caution in contracting a
 lifelong bond. If they misjudged the case, the pain and penalty were
 theirs. "To the libertine, the egoist, the selfish, sensual seeker of personal
 and present enjoyment at whatever cost to others, the indissolubility
 of marriage is an obstacle, a restraint, a terror: and God forbid that it
 should ever cease to be!"8 That the indecisive, the deluded, the trusting,
 and the optimistic got caught in this trap as well was of little concern
 to Horace Greeley.
 An alternate view, put forth most forcefully by Andrews and Owen,
 argued that family law should enable free choice and facilitate human
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 relations in a way that approximated the laissez-faire model of economic
 regulation. Stanton sympathized with Owen and Andrews, assailing
 Greeley's view of law as Draconian and old fashioned.9 For all three,
 the emphasis on human will mandated a new view of law, one more
 enabling than coercive. They retained law within their social program,
 but as the servant and not the master: "Marriage itself, like the Sabbath,
 was made for man; not man for marriage."'0 A law that forced the
 continuation of an unhappy relation obstructed its purpose of securing
 happiness, and should be changed. "There is no absolute right or wrong
 about this matter of divorce; but that it may properly vary in its details
 at different stages of civilization."'1
 Early nineteenth-century radicals and communitarians such as Robert
 Owen and Frances Wright had constructed the groundwork for such
 claims well before the meeting at Seneca Falls: however controversial
 and heretical their teachings remained, they had received a wide public
 airing.'2 But although this radical tradition was at hand, most early
 feminists eschewed it. An emphasis on liberty, on the affective nature
 of the marriage bond, and on the need for divorce to ensure the
 happiness of the individual were strikingly absent from early feminist
 discourse. Perhaps with the exception of Stanton-a major exception-
 they did not thrill to the "right" to dissolve the marriage bond and
 seek their romantic fortunes elsewhere. Rather, those who first approved
 of divorce saw it as self-defense, a measure of last resort to counter
 physical violence leveled at women by drunken and abusive husbands.
 Before the Civil War, feminist arguments for divorce were not made
 in terms of an abstract right to individual liberty, but in more pragmatic
 terms, the most fundamental being the instinct for self-preservation.
 Story after story in women's papers such as the Lily and the Una, and
 in other works both fictional and factual, stressed the combined burdens
 of overwork and brutal treatment that could result in insanity or death
 for wives and mothers. Tales of marital violence were so frequent and
 widely known that one child-probably the son of reformers-grew
 up thinking of murder as a common contingency of marriage.'3
 Antebellum feminists most often invoked duties rather than rights
 as justification for divorce, particularly the mother's duty to children.
 Many women initially feared crossing the border into the land of
 absolute rights-bearers, and even Stanton-whose views were, as always,
 more radical-dwelt heavily on maternal obligation rather than rights
 in exhorting women to recognize the need for full and free divorce in
 cases of chronic inebriation.'4 The physical safety of a drunkard's
 children was at issue as well as that of their mother; liberal feminists
 stressed her duty to remove them to a safer environment.
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 The obligation to protect extended beyond living children to children
 unborn, and it became the basis of antebellum feminists' arguments
 for refusing husbands their "rights" in the marriage bed. Stanton relied
 heavily on what Linda Gordon has described as a folk wisdom of
 eugenics, preaching widely on the poor genetic harvest of unwilling
 unions.'5 Exploiting the nineteenth-century passion for statistics, she
 calculated that of the nearly 1300 idiots in Massachusetts, between
 1110 and 1200 had been born of alcoholic parents, and urged women
 to sever immediately conjugal relations with husbands who drank:
 "The unspeakable misery of looking a laughing idiot in the face and
 calling him 'my son' is known but to the mother's heart -the drunkard's
 wife."'6 Stanton's and Anthony's scientific Calvinism stressed the her-
 itability of sin and preached that "[N]o woman should consent to be
 the wife of a drunkard because she may be the medium of stamping
 new forms of immortality on his gross, carnal nature...." At one New
 York Women's State Temperance Convention it was resolved that "it
 is a sin for any woman to consent to entail on innocent beings the
 curse and degradation that are the certain heritage of the Drunkard's
 offspring.. ."'7 Recognizing that abandoning the marriage bed was a
 painful and audacious step, Stanton counseled her readers that God in
 his benevolence never intended such a travesty of human happiness as
 a virtuous woman tied for life to a "loathsome, putrid carcass."'8
 The brutalized wife presented the most vivid and compelling case
 for divorce, but a higher-minded strain of thought ran through ante-
 bellum divorce arguments as well. One of the abolitionists' strongest
 arguments was that slavery illegitimately interposed human authority
 between the individual and God, thwarting that person's growth and
 development according to God's plan. The antebellum protest against
 the usurpation of God's authority took on new form in decrying
 marriage as subsuming the individuality of one person to the will of
 another. For liberal Protestants in full revolt against both the theology
 and political implications of Calvinist orthodoxy, the binding of the
 human will was both a crime and a sin, in marriage as elsewhere.
 Stanton and fellow feminist Antoinette Brown Blackwell adopted and
 embroidered this argument, using it to challenge the husband's au-
 thority.19 Stanton asked: "[H]ow can [woman] subscribe to a theology
 which makes her the conscious victim of another's will, forever subject
 to the triple bondage of man, priest, and the law... ? How can she
 endure our present marriage relations by which woman's life, health,
 and happiness are held so cheap that she herself feels that God has
 given her no charter of rights, no individuality of her own?"20
 Obedience to God was a far easier principle for mainstream feminists
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 to accept than one of individual happiness through severing the marital
 bond. The liberal Protestant notion of a newly benevolent God with
 designs for each individual's happiness provided Stanton with an
 argument in favor of divorce that was more acceptable to contempo-
 raries in the 1850s. Stanton thus introduced into the divorce debate-
 embedded in a theory of divine will and human duty-the ideas of
 individual happiness and the importance of personal growth, concepts
 that she would later develop into claims for personal autonomy.
 Marriage and Slavery in the Post-War Period
 In the post-Civil War period, the rhetoric of divorce changed dra-
 matically as the language of rights replaced that of duty to God or
 children. For feminists, caught up in the great public debates of the
 post-war period, the wrongs of brutalized wives served as a catalyst for
 early consciousness of individual rights: "[it is] difficult to depict the
 woes of the drunkard's wife... without saying that her rights have
 been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully withheld."2 Earlier, divorce
 had been understood as an act of self-defense; now it became an issue
 of personal liberty. The idea of the right to one's body and to one's
 labor was a critical tenet of post-war political theory; liberal feminists
 adapted this "rights" definition to their own ends.
 Slavery had ended, but slavery/freedom became the ruling paradigm
 through which liberal feminists conceived and developed their vision
 of rights within marriage. The analogy between marriage and slavery
 was natural and powerful, the conclusion inescapable: "Did the wives
 of all drunkards know that they have no master but God-that they
 are their own, and not the property of man-that woman is endowed
 with the same wants and capacities, and entitled to the same rights
 and privileges with him, they would not long wear the yoke of
 slavery. .. 22
 Feminists' reliance on slavery imagery to express the plight of women
 grew naturally from the early ties with the abolitionist movement. The
 fledgling pre-Civil War woman's rights movement was ignited and
 fueled by women whose involvement in the anti-slavery movement
 had convinced them that arguments from natural rights and human
 dignity applied equally to women. Early feminists had labeled their
 own conditions as slavery, referring largely to the civil wrongs of
 coverture and disfranchisement. The direct analogy between slavery
 and marriage appeared less frequently: Despite criticisms of its legal
 trappings, the institution of marriage itself was accorded great deference.
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 After the war, though, liberal feminists' use of slavery imagery took
 on a new directness, serving to describe the actual physical and
 emotional relations between husband and wife. Slavery imagery gained
 dominance and new meaning, and bondage became the metaphor of
 choice for pro-divorce feminists. Marriage itself had not become sig-
 nificantly more oppressive in those few years. Rather, the Emancipation
 Proclamation and the subsequent constitutional amendments offered
 a compelling new model for the articulation of grievances, grievances
 that in the slave's case had already been addressed with a suggestive
 array of constitutional rights and remedies. During the Civil War, anti-
 slavery ideology had developed into a political force invoking newly
 powerful models of government intervention to redress slavery's wrongs.
 In many respects, anti-slavery rhetoric was a more powerful political
 tool after the war precisely because of its new legal status. For antebellum
 reformers, slavery had held the status of a sin, a widespread corrupt
 practice that had offended notions of natural and divine law. By the
 late 1860s, enslavement had essentially become a crime, which human
 law outlawed and whose consequences human law sought to redress.
 The woman's rights movement's reliance on the mechanisms of human
 law grew reciprocally with the government's administration of equal
 protection standards through statutes and constitutional amendments.
 With feminist theory newly oriented toward legislative and policy goals,
 the franchise foremost among them, the slavery paradigm took on a
 new value as a language of political opposition.23
 In gross terms, middle-class women who compared themselves to
 bondswomen may seem melodramatic and self-aggrandizing. But fem-
 inists felt themselves in both acute physical and spiritual bondage. The
 slavery/freedom dichotomy helped articulate common apprehensions
 of the illegitimacy of male and masterly authority, as well as women's
 genuine outrage at a marital servitude that many felt keenly was as
 degrading as actual bondage. In describing bad marriages, women spoke
 of being crushed, dwarfed, broken, crippled-a language of assaults
 on the body that resonated wildly in the immediate aftermath of the
 slavery contest. Stories abounded of wives who pictured themselves as
 "legalized slaves" to "masters" who meted out brutal treatment un-
 checked and unprovoked. An article in the Revolution entitled "The
 Slavery of Woman" offered a standard catalog of seductions, rapes, and
 assaults to which women had been subjected. One writer suggested, in
 the absence of anyone to raise a cry of "murder," that "we do it for
 ourselves, by stepping into the footprints of Garrison."24
 For those women who were fortunate enough to escape actual
 violence, codes and customs appeared to create manacles no less
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 confining for being based on law, habit, and public sentiment. Even
 the ostensibly autonomous female body was encumbered by a scaf-
 folding of hoops, buttons, and stays. One mother asked in defense of
 the Bloomer costume, "ought we, my child, to be enslaved by anything
 that cramps the freedom of the soul... ?"25 Stanton eloquently declared
 that "[O]ur evolution thus far is but a struggle to stretch ourselves
 while bound hand and foot, to fly with clipped wings, to breathe with
 an anesthetic held to mouth and nose... the oneness of man and
 woman [is] a oneness that makes woman a slave."26 Women wrote and
 read books with titles such as Hedged In, Forced Vows, and Fettered
 for Life, or; Lord and Master27
 Women's writing also made frequent literary use of the escape scene
 inspired by fugitives from the South. Diatribes against the laws of
 parental custody were laden with descriptions that drew on the Eliza
 story from Uncle Tom's Cabin, the slave mother escaping with her
 child, hounds baying at her heels. Such mothers, escaping their op-
 pressive husbands, asked, "but he will follow me, will traduce me, and
 take my baby away from me, and the law won't give me my freedom,
 will it?"28
 This sentimentalized presentation of marital enslavement and its
 consequences among all classes of society is portrayed vividly in Fettered
 for Life, or, Lord and Master, written in 1874 by the prominent suffragist
 and Stanton-sympathizer, Lillie Devereaux Blake. Despite its traditional
 format, the novel's moral was unconventional. The mortality rate for
 the novel's female characters is improbably high, and the author
 unsubtly conveys her message that "man-marriage," or the common
 model of male domination, takes a toll on women. Marital slavery
 plays itself out differently for each class, however, in a way that shows
 the growing recognition of class distinctions in feminist political analysis.
 Antebellum divorce and anti-marriage rhetoric had pictured all women
 as potential victims of a husband's drunken violence without acknowl-
 edging hurts or rights special to any group. But in Fettered for Life,
 women of different classes are at risk in different ways, and follow out
 particular patterns in their marriages.
 The novel's working-class female characters-Biddy, Rhoda, Mrs.
 Blodgett-are especially vulnerable to physical abuse and have all been
 victimized by overt male brutality: seduced and abandoned like Rhoda,
 or like Biddy brought to death's door by an abusive spouse. Mrs.
 Blodgett, whose marriage to an underworld figure we follow throughout
 the narrative, remains a loving and subservient mate to a small-time
 criminal who finally kicks her to death in a drunken frenzy toward the
 end of the novel.
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 By contrast, the genteel and middle-class Mrs. Moulder, overworked
 mother of three, suffers a more subtle oppression at the hands of a
 grumpy and domineering newspaper editor, who shreds her dreams of
 a more cultivated life with his mundane tyrannies rather than his fists.
 Violence here is displaced onto her pet canary, which Mr. Moulder
 kills with a thoughtless (but significant) blow while trying to return it
 to its cage. Mrs. Moulder, undone by the excitement, suffers a miscar-
 riage and sinks into physical decline.
 Harsh as these scenarios are, Blake saves the most vivid slave imagery
 for the case of Flora, wealthy daughter of a prominent businessman
 and best friend of the heroine. Clearly the gay, innocent, and talented
 Flora represents for Blake the most compelling and sympathetic case,
 one of "pure" enslavement without actual physical violence or demand.
 While relying heavily on images of male violence, middle-class feminists
 admitted that, in their understanding, women like themselves experi-
 enced less abuse than working-class women, for whom marital violence
 was often a way of life.29 While including domestic violence as an
 important part of their critique, many liberal feminists began to stress
 the suffering of the spirit above the suffering of the body as the true
 enslavement. The story of Flora illustrates how the slavery metaphor
 took on new meaning in their hands, as they focused more and more
 on the stifling of the will, talents, and independence as the most serious
 consequences of women's bondage.
 Descriptions of the courtship of Flora and the worldly, wealthy roue
 who pursues her are shot through with the language of mastery. For
 months Flora resist LeRoy's overtures, fearing to become his "slave
 for life." Finally catching her unawares one night on the veranda, he
 forces a kiss on her, murmuring "my sweet trembling little prisoner,
 you are fairly caught. Give me your promise." In the face of his
 "irresistable will," "forceful eyes," "detaining hands," Flora "remained
 passive, unable to escape." After the kiss, "she was no longer free, no
 longer belonged to herself, she had received a master, and been
 compelled to submit to the symbol of his power....'I have passed
 under the yoke,' she thought, 'I am a slave.' " Thwarted in her attempt
 to escape, Flora continues to struggle weakly throughout the marriage
 ceremony, but "the iron clasp held her fast," and the vows were taken.30
 Predictably, the marriage is an unhappy one: LeRoy forbids Flora to
 walk alone, see old friends, or follow her own pursuits. In defiance she
 takes up her writing again, and out of her anguish produces an
 extraordinary poem, which she secretly sends off for publication.
 LeRoy's anger at her independence precipitates a crisis and Flora's
 decline. On her deathbed she tells him that she can only be well again
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 if he will lift his ban on the publication of her works; he refuses.31 Her
 dying words to him are "Remember that women, as well as men, need
 an occupation for their energies, and marriage without love is worse
 than death.... There is light above my head-light and freedom!"32
 Fettered for Life is emblematic of much liberal feminist thought,
 illustrating how the problem of wasted talents and the quest for
 professional opportunity-subjects with particularly middle-class ap-
 peal-became increasingly intertwined with the anti-slavery rhetoric
 of the marriage critique.33 The right to hold a job, to pursue a career
 or profession, came to be seen as a critical part of woman's emanci-
 pation.
 Marriage and Freedom of Contract
 Slavery's antithesis in nineteenth-century political discourse was
 freedom, and feminists' equation of marriage and slavery compelled
 their audiences to contemplate divorce through its obvious analogy,
 emancipation. The traditional marriage was undergoing its own Re-
 construction. As Stanton declared, the growing number of divorces was
 not a sign of declining morals, but exactly the opposite: "Woman is in
 a transition period from slavery to freedom, and she will not accept
 the conditions of family life that she has heretofore meekly observed."34
 According to the feminist agenda, what did freedom or emancipation
 entail for the married woman? In the view of a growing number of
 liberal feminists led by Stanton, its most important tenets were self-
 ownership within marriage and a right to divorce if the marriage became
 degrading.
 Linda Gordon and other historians of women have talked about
 "self-ownership" as a form of birth control ("voluntary motherhood")
 and as a radical assertion of sexual autonomy within marriage, both
 critical parts of nineteenth-century feminists' claims.35 The term itself-
 clearly predicated on slavery and coined to signify its literal opposite-
 drew on both abolitionist and free-love traditions. As Gordon has
 pointed out in her chapter on "Voluntary Motherhood," despite pro-
 found disagreement on other scores, a wide range of women activists-
 including free lovers, liberal feminists, and the more conservative
 Christian suffragists of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union-
 concurred that married women were entitled to choose or refuse sex
 at will, according to their own desires and their wish to conceive. Thus,
 the "right to her own person" became a key feminist concept, language
 with little resonance in the earlier period.36 Stantonians claimed that
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 next to self-ownership, which should "determine the future of the race,"
 suffrage represented only a "simple question of political privilege."37
 In a larger sense, Stanton and her sympathizers, in common with
 Victoria Woodhull, were attempting to restructure the idea of "right"
 to eliminate "obligation" altogether, broadly privileging the right to be
 free of obligation above the right to insist on the performance of a
 legal or contractual duty. They declared that "woman's degradation is
 in man's idea of his sexual rights." Placing woman's right to refuse
 above man's need for sexual relations, they denied that there was any
 male right at all, or any corresponding wifely duty.38 Drawing on the
 romantic anti-institutionalism of antebellum reform, liberal feminists
 transposed that language into an endorsement of voluntarism and
 radical personal autonomy. They decried the coercion of "marriage as
 a compulsory bond enforced by law and rendered perpetual by that
 means" and labeled every action and every relation that resulted from
 external coercion inherently corrupt.39
 Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly took this road farther than even
 Stanton and Anthony did. An article with the suggestive title "Marriage
 Versus Freedom," whose author claimed Stanton's and Anthony's
 blessing on her views, declared that "[F]reedom is the only right worth
 striving for... if, indeed, there are any other rights outside of and apart
 from personal freedom." She dismissed critics' objections that mutual
 obligations rendered complete personal freedom impossible: "[N]o
 person has any right to assume, to impose, such dependence on another
 as will make the exercise of that other's free will a source of unhappiness.
 Neither single nor mutual obligations should extend any further than
 the purest free will prompts; and then they are not obligations at all,
 but favors instead...."40
 Although the writers for Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly went beyond
 most mainstream feminists in their emphasis on individual liberty,
 Stanton herself was in complete sympathy with their claims. She even
 publicly defended the position of mistress over that of wife on the
 grounds that it was a voluntary relationship and not legal bondage.41
 This inherent privileging of a right to be free of obligations over any
 right to exact obligations impugned not just the marital bond, but an
 older structure that rested on reciprocal concepts of rights and duties:
 rights and obligations derived from status, by which the law described
 the roles and relationships of pairs like master-slave, husband-wife,
 parent-child. The rights that liberal feminists asserted-the right to
 vote, to own property, and to act as guardians of their own children-
 worked to destroy some of the rights formerly vested in men, but put
 no one under any continuing obligation, and engaged no one in any
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 reciprocal relationship. Liberal feminists repeatedly expressed their legal
 strategy as an attempt to lift laws that restrained and coerced, rather
 than as a way to obligate or coerce others. In the grand scheme, they
 sought "[F]reedom, freedom from all unnecessary entanglements and
 concessions, freedom from binding obligations involving impossibilities,
 freedom to repair mistakes, to express the manifoldness of our own
 natures, and to progress on, to advance to higher planes of develop-
 ment."42 Such radical autonomy left little room for ties. In their desire
 for freedom, in that binary understanding of slavery and freedom,
 which construed any customary or legal bond as making one unfree,
 liberal feminists predicated their claims on the assertion that "the laws
 of the individual sovereignty of women are more sacred than any
 human tie."43
 In this attempt to reconstruct the nature of obligation, liberal feminists
 moved naturally toward legal concepts. Seeking to recast the marriage
 relationship on more nearly equal terms, they groped for language that
 could express their vision in ways harmonious with mainstream thought.
 Contract was an obvious choice. The contractual ideal was pervasive
 in nineteenth-century society, so much so that to speak of feminists
 invoking contract as a "strategy" is misleading; it was the common
 coin of intellectual life, spreading far beyond its legal bounds to influence
 notions of reciprocity, obligation, and personal and business relations.
 Use of the slavery paradigm brought the issue of freedom of contract
 into play: In effect, the condition of slavery had less to do with
 disfranchisement than with a slave's more immediate inability to sever
 old work ties and form new ones and to bargain for a fair wage-
 powers that acquired almost mystical importance in the years around
 the Civil War. In addition to its more general civil status, then,
 "freedom" took on a narrower definition in the ability to make and
 break agreements at will.44 Contract provided women both with a
 theory of equal and reciprocal duties within an ongoing relation and
 also with a model for breaking that relation when the bargain went
 sour.
 In addition to seeking justification for their interpretations of the
 marriage obligation in the law of contract, liberal feminists invoked
 God in their support as the first author of the dissoluble marriage
 contract. Stanton repeatedly pointed out, in her voluminous writings
 and far-flung speaking tours, that any legal bond that condemned one
 party to an unhappy and degraded existence violated God's own first
 plan for human happiness; the legal bond of marriage, then, must give
 way to God's most sacred decree, reinterpreted by his zealous female
 apostles in America as "what God had not joined together, let man
 36
 Matrimonial Bonds
 put asunder.45 According to Stanton, God's own laws now required
 of human beings that, rather than a sacramental or covenant theory
 of marriage relations, they subscribe to a theory of marital contract,
 with its inherent destructability. No bond in this new world could be
 irrevocably formed, for "any constitution, compact, or covenant be-
 tween human beings, that failed to promote human happiness, could
 not... be of any force or authority; and it would be not only a right,
 but a duty, to abolish it."4
 For Stanton, the concept of contract represented largely the dereg-
 ulation of marriage, the noninterference of church and state in the
 private realm. It is true that feminists in the 1850s were on the cusp
 of change: Initially repudiating human regulation as inimical to self-
 government, women activists were beginning to see law as a tool that
 could be manipulated for their own ends. But it was the enabling rather
 than the enforcing power of law that appealed to feminists who sought
 to reform the marriage contract. Their view of the law of contract,
 although oversimplified, held that "all contracts, covenants, agreements,
 and partnerships are left wholly at the discretion of the parties."47
 Stanton did give some credence to the power of government to
 regulate the initial formation of contracts, including marriage. Citing
 the need for safeguards like minimum age, competence, and full
 disclosure, she encouraged legislators to remedy "the absence of form
 and dignity in the marriage contract which is unknown in any other
 civilized nation" with a strict set of prior conditions.48 But this list also
 reads as a set of contractual defenses, setting out grounds on which
 she thought divorce should be more easily granted or marriages an-
 nulled. Stanton pointed out that in other civil contracts, failure to
 comply with the conditions of entrance "vitiates the contract, and it
 is annulled by the mutual agreement of both parties. But in the marriage
 contract, which the state allows to be formed so thoughtlessly, ignorantly,
 irreverently, the parties have no control whatever, though ofttimes in
 its formation and continuance all laws of decency and common sense
 are at defiance... "49 Stanton sought tough entry and easy exit, but
 felt that stricter regulation of the creation of a marriage contract would
 cut down on failed marriages.
 The notion of free contract served as a blueprint for remodeling the
 marriage relationship as well as for ending it. A part of the liberal
 project on marriage entailed demystifying it by applying to it the
 everyday terms of bargain and exchange, which governed arms-length
 agreements for services. Feminists used contractual analogies to describe
 faithful adherence to their marital terms, despite men's repeated vio-
 lations of their own. Many men refused to perform their own obligations
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 while insisting that women meet theirs, thus moving the agreement
 from the realm of contract into slavery.50 Several different writers for
 the Revolution in particular employed the language of employment
 relations and free labor to urge woman's more equal participation in
 "the marital partnership," lest the common imbalance "involve the
 bank of matrimony in hopeless bankruptcy."5 The Revolution's boosting
 of free labor and free trade was not purchased with George Francis
 Train's money, but served as an integral part of a system of thought
 in which external compulsion was synonymous with imbalance or
 disfunction.52
 The author of an unattributed four-part series of articles entitled
 "The Husband of Today" seems to have taken a leaf from the debate
 over the ownership of the craftsman's tools when she complains that
 the wife has "no legal right to that home which she is dutifully expected
 to beautify and make pleasant" because man has the "rightful ownership
 of all the goods and chattels of the family," rendering the wife little
 more than a slave. Like any other artisan, woman claimed more control
 of the workplace and of her "tools." When houses were designed by
 men, they misplaced the pantries and the sinks, little understanding
 the uses to which such objects were put: "The wife has, doubtless, good
 reason for the hot fire, the open draught, the large wash ... she doubtless
 knows (her job) better than her husband," whose ignorant "sole
 management" only puts him in the category of "officious intermeddler."
 Sharply criticizing the profit motive, which made men unwilling to
 invest capital in the home, the author cites many women who "com-
 plained in the roundest terms, in the bitterest Saxon, that they were
 the drudges, the household slaves of money-getting husbands, who,
 provided they could lay by year after year money (one lady said $3,000)
 of profits, are either indifferent to, or do not appreciate, the cares,
 sorrows, and overtoil of their wives... with all the heavy claims of
 maternity, being made to work full up to the mark, like the man day-
 laborer... a dreary slavery in the free states." Women's rights included
 the right "to herself, to the use of all the powers and facilities God has
 given her, and the rights to the profits of her labor....53
 Visions of the Family
 This vision of women's marital enslavement and emancipation
 through the recasting of marriage as a contract dissoluble at will-
 largely Stanton's vision-remained highly controversial within fem-
 inism itself, as well as attracting bitter criticism and attacks from
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 outside. Opponents claimed that liberal reformers' programs threatened
 the nuclear family, and, in fact, these reformers did have a distinctive
 agenda with regard to the family's role and function. Within the larger
 debate, Greeley, as usual, staked out the orthodox position with his
 contention that the family's main function was, as the social agent of
 breeding, to provide for the training and education of children. This
 rationale bolstered his argument that the importance of lifelong marriage
 outweighed the happiness of the individual parties, because it best
 served the goals of stability and social order.
 Liberal feminists emphatically rejected this utilitarian view, insisting
 that motherhood was simply one incident of womanhood, not its
 defining parameter.54 Reacting against attempts to shame women back
 into the home with stories of neglected children and motherly duty,
 they downgraded the maternal bond from the primary place it held in
 the nineteenth century to stand as only one of many other rights and
 obligations that made up female life, foremost among them the right
 to self. The contract model of marital relations could not easily be
 fitted to the parent-child relationship, but in rejecting the covenant
 model of permanent bonds, liberal feminists, with both intellectual and
 emotional conviction, sought to loosen their maternal ties by denying
 the aspect of demand or duty. Stanton's hypersensitivity to forced
 bonds led her to class all bodily obligations as feudal in nature; the
 law of perpetual physical union was an ancient horror from "those
 dark periods when marriage was held by the greatest doctors and priests
 of the church to be a work of the flesh only."55
 Such thoughts contributed to the accurate impression of many of
 the movement's critics that woman's rights, at least as Stanton envi-
 sioned them, would radically alter the marriage relationship. Indeed,
 the essence of that traditional bond would have been changed by the
 creed that held, "the moment any act expected of a person becomes
 compulsory, it becomes correspondingly irksome."56 In his writings,
 Greeley had emphasized the social bases of family relations. Stanton,
 Andrews, and Owen, by contrast, sought to establish marriage as an
 affective relationship based on a romantic love that was voluntary,
 ephemeral, spontaneous, and unresponsive to legal coercion. They
 looked to the "highest good of the individual. It is the inalienable right
 of all to be happy. It is the highest duty to seek those conditions in
 life, those surroundings, which may develop what is noblest and best."57
 Marriage was not a legal bond or social duty, but an affective relationship
 of mutual love and kindness, "intended by God for the greater freedom
 and happiness of both parties."58 Downplaying its physical aspect,
 divorce reformers suggested that "It is not mere physical infidelity but
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 that adultery of the heart which quenches conjugal love; thus destroying
 that which, far more justly than your cohabitation till death, may be
 regarded as 'the essence of marriage.'"59 By this standard, marriage
 "fulfills God's intentions so long as the domestic home is the abode of
 purity, of noble sentiment, of kindness...." By this standard, too, a
 marriage is broken not just by catastrophic upheaval, but when it
 becomes "the daily cause of grievous words and heartless deeds-of
 anger, strife, selfishness, cruelty, ruffianism."60
 Clearly, a marital relation that existed only through the rigor of the
 law and not the mutual love and ongoing consent of the parties was
 not conducive to the highest human development, and the furthering
 of happiness and human growth became the new standard by which
 social and political functions were judged. Utilitarianism combined
 with the developing creed of liberal Protestantism to produce a new
 rationale for institutions from the state down to the family. It was to
 accommodate this new vision of the family as constituted by the
 ongoing consent of the parties rather than by legal forms that Stanton
 sought to recast the marriage bond to eliminate any element of
 irrevocability or coercion from outside. She denied that marriage vows
 were anything but a voluntary, temporary mutual agreement for the
 benefit of both. Citing the "weakness and blindness" that led human
 beings to make poor decisions in the choice of business partners,
 legislators, teachers, and other public officers, she urged that the far
 graver matrimonial bond should be a "contract-no more perpetual
 than either or all of the former."61 By 1870, Stanton declared that in
 the Protestant world the question was no longer whether marriage was
 a sacrament or a contract, but, as a contract, for what reasons it might
 be dissolved.62
 Stanton envisioned the family as reforming along the lines of the
 republican state: it would consist of free and independent individuals,
 voluntarily contracting for a corporate existence during the pleasure of
 the parties, each protected in its own autonomy by inalienable individual
 rights.63 Many other feminists, though, felt the limitations inherent in
 the wholesale adoption of the personal liberty model of social change.
 The strict dichotomy between slavery and freedom worked to create a
 scheme of personal rights that could not accommodate the genuine
 physical and emotional dependencies of family relations. Stanton's
 rhetoric often pitted woman's right to herself against intimate demands
 pictured only as cloying and confining. For Stanton, "a single life of
 self-reliance, dignity, individual growth and development, is more sacred




 Many feminists and reformers from across the spectrum resisted as
 pernicious Stanton's attempts to apply a commercial theory of contract
 to the marriage relation. Opponents of liberal divorce founded their
 arguments on the importance of the ideal, if not always the reality, of
 marriage as a permanent institution. For them, Stanton's use of contract
 theory provided a model of family relations that neither worked
 realistically to redress inequality, nor acknowledged the durability and
 permanence of parental or marital ties.
 Religious precepts helped to shape these differing visions. Feminists
 like Antoinette Brown Blackwell resisted Stanton's contract theory,
 maintaining instead a covenantal view of marriage. Blackwell adopted
 a Christian ideal of marriage, not through an unthinking adherence to
 scriptural commands and injunctions, but through a belief in the
 doctrines of salvation, redemption, perfectionism, and atonement.
 Stanton offered human incompetence and frequent errors in choosing
 business partners, teachers, and other important contacts as evidence
 that the ability to dissolve such relations should always exist and in
 marriage, more so, since mistakes were frequent and costly. Blackwell
 too acknowledged problems within marriage, but her faith in marriage
 as a relation encompassed the "growth and assimilation of the parties"
 to each other and the smoothing out of differences over time that only
 the permanence of marriage would promote. The nature of moral life
 required that human beings maintain, if not the attraction and affection
 of their salad days, at least the "devotion to the good of another, and
 especially to the good of the sinful and guilty, [which] like all disinter-
 estedness, must redound to the highest good of its author... obedient
 to the highest laws of benevolence."65 A husband's irresponsibility
 provided the opportunity for a wifely redemptive intervention, for as
 a Christian she could "never enjoy peace or rest until [she had]...
 thus reclaimed him and brought him out of his sins ... as [she] would
 work to save [her] children, brothers, sister, and the whole human
 family."66
 Blackwell saw marriage not as a "tie" as Stanton had suggested, with
 the inbuilt possibility of untying, but as a "relation," which once formed
 can never be destroyed: one can "untie" but not unrelate.67 For her, it
 was a critical, defining element of human nature that individuals could
 form a marriage relation through a single act of will that had permanent
 consequences. She frequently made analogies between marriage and
 biological ties, asking, "Can the mother ever destroy the relation which
 exists between herself and the child? Can the father annul the relation
 which exists between himself and the child? Then, can the father and
 mother annul the relation which exists between themselves, the parents
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 of the child? It cannot be."68 Like Greeley, Blackwell believed that
 marriage by its nature continued for the lives of the spouses. Unlike
 him, she did not base her claim directly in social good, but in an
 imperative for the moral development of the individual. For her, the
 extraordinary characteristic of human love was the way in which it
 approximated divine love, in that it outlasted the span of human life.
 By contrast, in Stanton's vision of romantic love, individual satis-
 faction described the nature of the bond. She derided the concept of
 Christian love in marriage, denying that husband and wife could ever
 act as saviors to each other. While her critics charged that love was a
 compound of "forebearance, patience, forgiveness, endurance," she
 eschewed these virtues, seeing marriage not as a process, a "soul
 perfecting itself through trial," but as a spontaneous emotional reaction.
 Stanton denied that love was an act of will, or that it could be
 deliberately prolonged by the parties once the fragile bloom was gone.69
 Blackwell and Stanton differed fundamentally in their understanding
 of the connection generated in marriage. Stanton perceived marriage
 as a tie susceptible to dissolution at will. Blackwell described marriage
 as a relation whose very formation, although voluntary, entailed a
 permanent bond. For feminists such as Jane Croly, who questioned
 such "connective" definitions of marriage, the ties of circumstance and
 relation were inevitable, the definition of life itself, without which it
 would be impoverished.
 We are tied from the moment we enter the world, and are probably the
 better and happier for it, though we may rebel against it. We are actual
 slaves to circumstances, which preceded our births, which enclosed us
 in a skin, which governed our height, our color, our shape, our strength
 or weakness, and over which we had not the least control. We are tied
 after birth to certain natural laws, which we very imperfectly understand,
 and of which we can only see the results. We are tied with cords woven
 by time itself to the habits and traditions which have preceded us; and
 more strongly still are we tied by our instincts and desires which, blind
 and unreasoning as they are, we are compelled to obey.... We see, then,
 there is very little of the freedom of which we boast so much in the
 matter.70
 Denying the theory of radical individual and bodily autonomy so
 important to Stanton, Croly saw interdependence: "as parts of one
 great body, we are all dependent upon and owe duties to each other."7'
 What autonomy does an arm have, or a foot? For Croly, a body isolated
 was a body devalued; such a fiction flew in the face of the authentic
 conditions of life.
 Stanton's refusal to acknowledge any social function of the family,
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 or any legitimate church or state interest in regulating it, tended toward
 the complete privatization of the family, marking that area off as
 "personal" and impervious to regulation, for better or worse.72 The
 family became an isolated sphere, governed by a contractual ideal.
 Although Stanton's vision of the family did not go uncontested by her
 contemporaries, it is largely this view of family law that has prevailed
 in courts and legislatures today.
 Protectionism and Liberalism
 Despite the resistance to Stanton's stand on divorce both from within
 the movement and without, her influence proved far greater than a
 polling of her opponents might suggest. Divorce itself remained con-
 troversial, but pro-divorce arguments were a critical piece of the far
 broader liberal rights theory of which Stanton was a chief architect.
 Political savvy kept her from openly declaring herself a free lover, but
 a common store of ideas with a free love stamp became the basis of
 Stanton's political creed.73 Indeed, in one sense self-ownership-con-
 strued also as self-respect-came to replace more traditional "virtue"
 in the feminist canon as the qualification for citizenship, through the
 claim that all wise and virtuous government rested on the foundation
 of a citizenry with a strong sense of individual mastery.74 Without these,
 political rights were meaningless, for
 if you go to a southern plantation and speak to a slave of his right to
 property, to the elective franchise, to a thorough education, his response
 will be a vacant stare... the great idea of his right to himself, of his
 personal dignity, must first take possession of his soul, and then he will
 demand equality in everything.... I repeat, the center and circumference
 of woman's rights is just what the slave's are. Personal freedom is the
 first right to be proclaimed, that does not and cannot belong to the
 relation of wife.75
 The very concept of "right," then, was predicated on a world where
 those rights were to be exercised free of the legal and social restraints
 imposed by obligation to others. Liberal feminists sought to make the
 absolute right to oneself the basis for the exercise of rights within the
 state, and their rhetoric on personal rights and rights within the family
 became the basis of their model for the exercise of political rights.76
 For Stanton, then, questions of family governance were measured by
 the same yardstick as questions about the role of the citizen in society
 and in the state.
 In addition to applying the forms of contract to marriage, divorce
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 reformers sought to tighten the correspondence between rights in the
 family and the civil realm by using constant analogies from other areas
 of law and public policy, which they brought to bear on the law of the
 family as well. To this end, Stanton, like Andrews and Owen, drew on
 analogies from liberal economic theory, free labor and free trade
 ideology, and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience
 and separation of church and state to sketch in a new model of family
 law. Sensing a deep intellectual kinship, all three conflated such issues
 as free divorce, free love, free labor, free contract, and free trade.77
 Stanton herself confirmed the connection between doctrines with the
 story of a man who refused Graham bread, "for he had noticed that
 if anybody began with bran bread, he was sure to end with infidelity"-
 a somewhat eccentric formulation of a great progressive truth.78 Their
 opponent Horace Greeley had little trouble recognizing these reformers'
 organic approach. He lumped free traders, usurers, tax dodgers, and
 advocates of easy divorce together in one morally bankrupt category,
 claiming that "the free trade sophistry respecting marriage is on every
 libertine's tongue."79 Andrews, for his part, commended Greeley, saying
 "You rightly refer free trade, freedom of the finances, freedom from
 state systems of religion and education, and freedom of the love relation,
 to one and the same principle, and that principle you recognize as the
 spirit of the age."80 Both sides, then, recognized that reformers were
 working to make the regulation of families of a piece with broader
 principles at work in areas of public and private commercial law. At
 heart, the problem in all areas was the same: to secure the removal of
 an external structure of laws to allow natural governing forces to assert
 themselves.
 Although his proposals and his understanding of women's sexual
 subordination were radical for his day (and perhaps for ours), Andrews's
 political theory embodied strong liberal tendencies through his belief
 in the irresistable power of an underlying order and the need to
 eliminate all external regulation to allow that order to work unimpeded,
 a philosophy to which Stanton subscribed as well. A devoted disciple
 of Fourier, ("who really was about the most remarkable genius who
 has yet lived"), Andrews subscribed to Fourier's "grand discovery that
 Attraction, which Newton discovered to be the law and the regulation
 of the motions of material bodies, is equally the law and the God-
 intended regulation of the whole affectional and social sphere in human
 affairs."81 When the artificial restraints of law and custom were removed,
 the powerful force of Attraction would insure that human affairs were
 self-regulating, both in the economic and in the more important erotic
 world. Andrews saw the progress toward a fully self-regulating world
 44
 Matrimonial Bonds
 as inevitable: "Freedom in love is the last attainment of the progressive
 civilized world. It is the culminating point toward which all other
 reforms tend. The system of restriction or arbitrary order in which the
 world was bound for ages is gradually dissolving."82
 Andrews and Stanton also analogized religious tolerance to liberal
 (non-regulatory) family laws, seeking to extend the established principles
 of freedom of conscience and of theological persuasion to cover
 unorthodox sexual relations as well. Andrews poked fun at one of his
 critics, suggesting that no "doubt... he, too, is honest in his statement
 of the doctrine of religious freedom, and that he would, in practice,
 recognize my right to live with three women, if my conscience approved,
 as readily and heartily as he would contend for the rights to read the
 Protestant Bible at Florence."83 Andrews claimed for himself "no better
 right to determine what is moral or proper for you to DO than... to
 determine what it is religious for you to BELIEVE," and likened such
 an attempt to the burnings at Smithfield. Any effort to regulate the
 moral lives of others through the mechanism of the state, Andrews
 suggested, would always end in the resort to such time-dishonored
 sanctions as "public odium, the prison, the gibbet, the hemlock, or the
 cross"-sanctions that may punish or suppress but never succeed in
 creating a truly harmonious order.84 Stanton heartily concurred that
 the rigid enforcement of the Christian ideal of lifelong monogamous
 marriage represented undue influence by church and state in the private
 lives of individuals.
 Stanton's own repeated advocacy of free labor, free trade, and free
 currency shows that she extended her belief in deregulation to the
 economy; and that there was more than a superficial affinity between
 her views on marriage, her philosophy of government, and classic
 liberal notions of laissez-faire.85 Indeed, reformers' efforts to meld those
 elements together shows a more complex face of liberalism than we
 usually see. Liberal theory is often portrayed as an amalgam of
 pessimism and human greed, but neither of these could account for
 the grip it took on American ideology. Stanton's liberalism was based
 firmly in a liberal Protestant creed that celebrated the innate goodness
 of human nature and its ability to find its own right course once
 external regulation was lifted. Despite her anticlericalism, Stanton was
 a child of the Second Great Awakening and subscribed to its tenets on
 the efficacy of human will.86 The Christian perfectionism of the ante-
 bellum period-perfection of the soul-translated for many in the
 post-war period into a perfection of the life and of the work-human
 happiness. Although their interests were not the same, liberal reformers
 made common cause with business interests on the best method of
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 securing change of any sort: deregulation. Nineteenth-century liberal-
 ism, then, was not a single strand, but a complex weave of economic,
 political, and religious philosophies, and it was much the stronger for
 it.
 The issue of protection had also been at stake in the wrangling that
 went on among Andrews, Owen, and Greeley in the decade before the
 Civil War. As an anarchist, Andrews was a strong proponent of self-
 government or self-sovereignty-the idea that any authority exercised
 by one human being over another interposed itself illegitimately between
 the individual and God's governance-a belief shared by abolitionists
 and feminists as well. In the context of free love, this concept expressed
 itself most radically in terms of the freeing of the body from any
 obligations imposed from without. A chief architect of the free lovers'
 creed of the absolute right of the individual to bodily mastery and
 integrity, that independence became for Andrews the single most
 important measure of social health, while the physical subjugation of
 women in American society was a prime indicator of its diseased state.
 Like Stanton, he saw bodily obligations as evidence of an ancient
 serfdom repugnant to enlightened minds. Andrews saw himself as a
 revolutionary fighting against "the defenders of slavery, and the fastid-
 ious aristocratic classes everywhere," as well as against all vestiges of
 the feudal structure of hierarchy, tenures, and paternalism, which placed,
 protected, and imprisoned the individual.
 Stanton's composite writings and pronouncements tended toward
 the disaggregation of the family as well, an outcome she found person-
 ally, socially, and politically desirable. Her philosophy of marriage
 emphasized the aspect of individual development, and the severing of
 obligatory ties and dependencies contributed to this.87 Socially as well,
 Stanton was convinced that only the removal of all restriction on
 women-domestic, civil, and physical-could bring them into a
 position of full equality. Politically, she classed the patriarchal family
 with "despotic governments (and) infallible churches.... Every new
 step in civilization tends to individual awareness, dignity, responsibility,
 alike in the church, the state, and the home."88 Clearly, the democratic
 reorganization of the family required that each individual be accorded
 full status and rights: Stanton denied that the "representative" theory
 of the family as a "unit" was acceptable. Government should deal with
 individuals, not with families, or with certain of its members as
 representatives of others.89
 Inherent in the push for the disaggregation of the family was the
 recognition that, like slavery or the harem, the protection offered by
 family membership was often at the price of liberty. For slaves, being
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 "'a part of the family'" had "protected" them from the onus of
 taxation, as well as denying them a civil voice: leaving the "family"
 changed both.90 Any physical obligation that owed its existence to a
 code or rule was similarly discredited: just as Horace Greeley denounced
 "the free trade sophistry respecting marriage," the liberal feminists
 equated the safety of marriage with the harem, paternalism, and slavery,
 claiming "protection is the leech that preys upon the heart of liberty."
 "Protectors" take on a sarcastic significance in Stanton's work as those
 who rape and seduce women.9'
 In fact, discussions of the marriage question both within and without
 organized feminism also centered on another set of issues-economic
 protection and the consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers.
 In 1860, Stanton's and Blackwell's optimistic beliefs in the potential
 for the liberated and energetic woman to achieve economic parity
 allowed both to ignore the problem of dependence.9 A decade later,
 some feminists were more skeptical. Stanton's brash and public ad-
 vocacy of divorce was an irritant that contributed to the estrangement
 of the New York and Boston feminist groups. Although Lucy Stone
 and Henry B. Blackwell almost certainly agreed with Stanton in private,
 they feared that her public stance would taint the quest for the ballot
 and lose the suffrage movement crucial support. They steadfastly refused
 to acknowledge the link between civil and domestic inequality, naively
 arguing that, once the lack of political rights for women had been
 redressed, relations between the sexes would right themselves as a
 natural consequence.
 At the same time, writers for the Woman's Journal, the paper of the
 American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), had another complaint
 to make: They found Stanton's rhetoric naive and disingenuous in its
 assumption that free divorce would primarily benefit women. How
 many mothers, under the circumstances, could afford to sweep grandly
 out and set up housekeeping on their own? Stone and her followers
 intimated that "freedom" for a divorced mother of six should be known
 as its other names, immiseration and abandonment. For the suffragists
 of the AWSA, divorce was at best an unfortunate necessity in cases of
 chronic spousal abuse, but free divorce in Stanton's terms represented
 "practically, freedom of unworthy men to leave their wives and children
 to starve, while it could not give similar freedom to mothers to leave
 their children."93 Neither wing of the suffrage movement showed any
 abiding sensitivity to the problems of working class women, the AWSA
 less than Stanton's group. The Boston contingent, though, grasped that
 the "right" of divorce must be seen in light of prevailing economic
 conditions, where "a wife with children, who has lost the help of her
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 husband, has undertaken a contest with fortune against heavy odds."94
 The imperative of self-sovereignty, then, left little room for financial,
 physical, or emotional obligation of any kind. As Andrews had earlier
 announced, "The great lesson for the world is that human beings do
 not need to be taken care of What they do need is such conditions of
 justice and friendly cooperation that they can take care of themselves."
 Stanton concurred that the dangers of protectionism far outweighed
 the problems of poverty.95
 Conclusion
 The adoption of the slavery metaphor for marriage-with its reflexive
 counter, freedom-had weighty consequences for the development of
 feminist thought in America. It gave feminists an immediate and
 powerful concept and a language of personal independence that reson-
 ated in the dominant culture. It also carried a transformative vision of
 equality. There were several feminist traditions in the nineteenth century,
 but it is this vision of liberation that the woman's movement of the
 mid-twentieth century has drawn on for support and sustenance. The
 ideal of personal freedom has proven durable as a spark to political
 action that addresses women's deepest concerns. More than a century
 later, well after political "equality" was established by the Nineteenth
 Amendment, the idea of escape from bondage fueled a women's
 movement that has changed the shape of American social life.
 At the same time, the process of defining rights, occurring both
 within feminism and in the larger political culture, through the paradigm
 of slavery and freedom, transformed their meaning. In Stanton's liberal
 view, shaped by her post-Civil War contractual view of marriage, rights
 originated in the private sphere, not within the context of social or
 public life. The Revolution argued that the assertion of self-ownership
 for women must become "the paramount and controlling influence of
 her life, for individual freedom of choice is the cornerstone of individual
 responsibility, and all virtue and wise government must rest on this
 foundation." Only then, when responsible alone to God and herself,
 she shall possess the right to life and liberty, she will occupy a position
 in which she will logically be capable of becoming a Beneficent Power."96
 Departing from the antebellum formulaton that rights were both the
 offspring and the agent of performing duties, Stanton insisted that
 rights were paramount and antecedent to duties. The earlier notion
 that the perfection of individual rights was the only means of protecting
 the rights of the community gave way to language that pitted the
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 individual against the community: Stanton concluded that "the best
 interests of a community can never require the sacrifice of one innocent
 being, of one sacred right."97
 The elevation of the individual right to a position of absolute authority
 created a philosophical framework in which it was easiest to recognize
 the negative right, the right to be free from something, where the
 balancing of rights through the recognition of binding claims by one
 person on another was made, if not impossible, at least conceptually
 dubious. Sarah Norton, a contributor to Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly,
 spoke for much of nineteenth-century feminism-indeed, much of
 nineteenth-century liberalism -when she asked, "wherein, then consists
 the value of a right that cannot be appropriated at the option of the
 individual possessing it? or how much of the value or usefulness
 remains, if it is to be subject to the control of some greater right?"98
 Liberal feminists, pushing the argument that "we do not live by
 bread alone," were compelled to downgrade the importance of financial
 "security" in marriage, in order to establish it as an affective relationship
 between equals.99 This emphasis hindered meaningful discussion among
 Stantonians about another set of issues-economic protection and the
 consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers. Ultimately, despite
 her quick sympathy with the oppressed of all sorts, Stanton's preoc-
 cupation with individual freedom prevented her from developing a
 coherent class-based theory that invoked systematic legal or institutional
 remedies to women's position in marriage. Stanton, throughout her
 life, maintained a belief in the primacy of change at the personal level.
 She judged civil perfection to be the result of the perfection of
 individuals, a belief that after the war was translated into a defense of
 individual rights. Stanton suggested that women's rise should follow
 the projected path of the slave: "end all this talk of class legislation,
 bury the Negro in the citizen, and claim the suffrage for all men and
 women." She rejected any argument based on the "rights of races,"
 and accepted as the only rationale for reform the slave's "manhood;
 his individual, inalienable right to freedom and equality; and thus...
 woman's case today."'??
 Such an idealistic response to the practical problems of racism and
 sexism has left a mixed legacy for twentieth-century feminists. Ulti-
 mately, Stanton's theories, by undermining the bonds between individ-
 uals within the family and by placing the source of rights in this
 deregulated private sphere, may have made it more difficult to assert
 group rights in the larger social setting. The contractual theory of liberal
 individualism has never proven a satisfactory mediator of family
 relations, nor has the extension of that theory into the civil sphere
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 created a basis for the assumption by the state of family obligations-
 day care, medical care for children, parental leave-that could genu-
 inely change the lives of working women.
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